State v. Jackson Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 39234 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
6-12-2013
State v. Jackson Respondent's Brief Dckt. 39234
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation





















IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 













Bonner Co. Case No. 
CR-2009-6579 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
OPY 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF BONNER 
HONORABLE STEVE VERBY 
District Judge 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
PAUL R. PANTHER 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
LORI A. FLEMING 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 




BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate 
Public Defender 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................. iii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ......................................................................... 1 
Nature of the Case ............................................................................... 1 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings ................................... 1 
ISSUES ........................................................................................................... 2 
ARGUMENT ................................................................................................... 3 
I. Jackson Has Failed To Show Any Violation Of 
11. 
His Right To An Impartial Jury ................................................... 3 
A. Introduction ..................................................................... 3 
B. 
C. 
Standard Of Review ........................................................ 3 
Jackson Has Failed To Show The District Court 
Erred, Much Less Committed Reversible Error, 
By Denying His Motion To Excuse Juror #34 For 
Cause ............................................................................. 4 
1. 
2. 
Jackson Was Not Entitled To the Removal 
For Cause of Juror #34 Because Juror #34 
Was Not Biased ................................................... 4 
Even If The Court Erred In Not Excusing 
Juror #34 For Cause, Jackson Has Failed 
To Show He Was Denied His Right To An 
Unbiased Jury ...................................................... 9 
Jackson Has Failed To Show The District Court 
Erred In Denying His Motion For Appointment Of 
Counsel To Pursue His Rule 35 Motion ................................... 15 
A Introduction ................................................................... 15 





































C. The District Court Properly Denied 
Jackson's Motion For Appointed Counsel 
To Pursue His Rule 35 Motion Because 
Jackson Failed To Carry His Threshold 
Burden Under I.C. § 19-854 Of Demonstrating 
He Was A "Needy Person" With Respect To 
That Motion ................................................................... 18 
D. Alternatively, The Denial Of Jackson's Motion 
For Court Appointed Counsel To Pursue His 
Rule 35 Motion Should Be Affirmed Because 
His Rule 35 Motion Was Frivolous ................................ 24 
CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 26 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ........................................................................ 27 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE 
Housley v. State, 119 Idaho 885, 811 P.2d 495 (Ct. App. 1991) ........................ 26 
Lockhart v. Mccree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986) ............................................................. 4 
McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 992 P.2d 144 (1999) ................................... 25 
Morris v. Thomson, 130 Idaho 138, 937 P.2d 1212 (1997) ............................... 4, 9 
Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 828 P.2d 1323 (Ct. App. 1992) ........................ 18 
Nightengale v. Timmel, 151 Idaho 347, 256 P.3d 755 (2011) .................... .4, 9, 10 
Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129 (2009) ................................................... 13 
Quinlivan v. State, 94 Idaho 334,487 P.2d 928 (1971) .............................. passim 
Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1988) ......................................................... .4, 10 
State v. Adams, 147 Idaho 857,216 P.3d 146 (Ct. App. 2009) .............. 11, 13, 14 
State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 253 P.3d 727 (2011) ......................................... 4 
State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 988 P.2d 1170 (1999) ..................................... .4 
State v. Hauser, 143 Idaho 603, 150 P.3d 296 (Ct. App. 2007) ........................... .4 
State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007) ..................................... 25 
State v. Lee, 153 Idaho 559,286 P.3d 537 (2012) ....................................... 17, 19 
State v. McDonald, 130 Idaho 963, 950 P.2d 1302 (Ct. App. 1997) ................... 26 
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961 (2010) ..................................... 11, 13 
State v. Ramos, 119 Idaho 568, 808 P .2d 1313 (1991) ...................................... 10 
State v. Stewart, 149 Idaho 383, 234 P.3d 707 (2010) ....................................... 25 
State v. Tucker, 97 Idaho 4, 539 P.2d 556 (1975) .............................................. 10 








































State v. Warren, 135 Idaho 836, 25 P.3d 859 (Ct. App. 2001) ........................... 26 
State v. Wozniak, 94 Idaho 312,486 P.2d 1025 (1971) ..................................... 10 
Swisher v. State, 129 Idaho 467, 926 P.2d 1314 (Ct. App. 1996) ...................... 18 
STATUTES 
I.C. § 19-852 ............................................................................................... passim 
I. C. § 19-854 ............................................................................................... passim 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Idaho Const. art. 1, §§ 7, 13 ................................................................................. 4 
U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV .............................................................................. 18 
U.S. Const. V, VI, XIV; Idaho Const. art. 1, §§ 7, 13 ............................................. 4 
iv 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Curtis Edward Jackson appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury 
verdict finding him guilty of three counts of lewd conduct with a minor under 16 
years of age. He also appeals from the district court's order denying his request 
for the appointment of counsel to pursue his Rule 35 motion. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Based on allegations that Jackson committed sexual offenses against an 
eight- or nine-year-old girl on multiple occasions in the summer and early fall of 
2009, the state charged him with three counts of lewd conduct with a minor 
under 16 years of age. (R., pp.27-28.) Jackson pied not guilty and the case 
proceeded to trial. (R., pp.41-42, 93-100.) On Jackson's motion, his first trial 
ended in a mistrial after the jurors, while deliberating, were inadvertently exposed 
to information that law enforcement had offered Jackson an opportunity to take a 
polygraph test. (R., pp.98-100.) The case proceeded to a second trial, at the 
conclusion of which the jury found Jackson guilty as charged. (R., pp.111-48.) 
The district court imposed concurrent unified sentences of life, with 15 years 
fixed. (R., pp.177-80.) Jackson timely appealed. (R., pp.172-73.) He also filed 
a timely pro se Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence and a motion for the 
appointment of counsel to pursue his Rule 35 motion, both of which the district 
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Jackson states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Whether Mr. Jackson was deprived of an impartial jury when 
the district court refused to excuse a biased juror for cause. 
2. Whether the district court erred by refusing to appoint Mr. 
Jackson an attorney to help him pursue his Rule 35 motion. 
(Appellant's brief, p.8.) 
1. 
2. 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
Has Jackson failed to show the district court erred, much less committed 
reversible error, by declining Jackson's request to excuse a juror for 
cause? 
Has Jackson failed to show error in the denial of his request for appointed 




Jackson Has Failed To Show Any Violation Of His Right To An Impartial Jury 
A. Introduction 
During voir dire, Jackson moved to excuse several prospective jurors "for 
cause." (See generally Trial Tr., pp.5-132.) The district court granted the 
majority of Jackson's requests, but denied his motion to excuse Juror #34. (Trial 
Tr., p.105, L.6 - p.108, L.22, p.116, L.19 - p.119, L.19, p.126, L.20 - p.132, 
L.17.) Jackson subsequently exercised one of his preemptory challenges to 
excuse Juror #34 and, as a result, Juror #34 did not sit on the jury. (Trial Tr., 
p.141, Ls.18-19; see also Trial Tr., p.144, Ls.9-18 (names of jurors ultimately 
empanelled).) 
Jackson argues on appeal that, by denying his request to excuse Juror 
#34 for cause, the district court deprived him of his constitutional right to an 
impartial jury. (Appellant's brief, pp.9-17.) Jackson's argument fails. Because 
Juror #34 was not biased, because she did not actually sit on the jury, and 
because Jackson has failed to show fundamental error with respect to his claim, 
raised for the first time on appeal, that other jurors who remained on the panel 
were actually biased, Jackson has failed to demonstrate any violation of his right 
to an impartial jury. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"The determination whether a juror can render a fair and impartial verdict 








































absent a showing of abuse of discretion." State v. Hauser, 143 Idaho 603, 609, 
150 P.3d 296, 302 (Ct. App. 2007) (citations omitted). 
C. Jackson Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred, Much Less 
Committed Reversible Error, By Denying His Motion To Excuse Juror #34 
For Cause 
1. Jackson Was Not Entitled To the Removal For Cause of Juror #34 
Because Juror #34 Was Not Biased 
"A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to trial by an impartial jury." 
State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 253 P.3d 727 (2011) (citing U.S. Const. V, VI, 
XIV; Idaho Const. art. 1, §§ 7, 13). Unless a prospective juror indicates an 
inability to "lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the 
evidence presented in court," it is presumed the prospective juror is impartial. Id. 
(quoting State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496,506,988 P.2d 1170, 1180 (1999)). As 
explained by the United States Supreme Court: 
[T]he Constitution presupposes that a jury selected from a fair 
cross section of the community is impartial, regardless of the mix of 
individual viewpoints actually represented on the jury, so long as 
the jurors can conscientiously and properly carry out their sworn 
duty to apply the law to the facts of the particular case. 
Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 86 (1988) (quoting Lockhart v. Mccree, 476 
U.S. 162, 184 (1986)). Consistent with these principles, "a trial court does not 
abuse its discretion by refusing to excuse for cause jurors whose answers during 
voir dire initially give rise to challenges for cause but who later assure the court 
that they will be able to remain fair and impartial." Morris v. Thomson, 130 Idaho 
138, 141, 937 P.2d 1212, 1215 (1997), quoted in Nightengale v. Timmel, 151 
Idaho 347, 353, 256 P.3d 755, 761 (2011 ); see also Ellington, 151 Idaho at 70, 
4 
253 P.3d at 744 (citation omitted) ("Although not always dispositive, the trial 
judge is entitled to rely on assurances from venire persons concerning partiality 
or bias."). Contrary to Jackson's assertions on appeal, application of these legal 
principles to the facts of this case shows the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying Jackson's motion to excuse Juror #34 for cause. 
In response to questioning by defense counsel during voir dire, Juror #34 
indicated an initial predisposition to believe the word of the nine-year-old victim 
over that of Jackson, stating "I think with the nature of this case if it's purely his 
word against hers and that's it, then I would - yeah, I would believe the little girl 
over a grown man." (Trial Tr., p.105, L.6 - p.108, L.2.) Defense counsel moved 
to "strike" Juror #34 for cause. (Trial Tr., p.108, Ls.18-22.) The prosecutor 
accepted the court's invitation for further inquiry and, after questioning Juror #34 
about her experiences as a health care professional, engaged in the following 
exchange with her: 
[Prosecutor]: Do you accept the fact that it's a very 
structured system that we have here in the criminal justice system, 
you may believe that someone is more likely guilty than not 
because they're seen over at the defense table but that the process 
there has to be proof before you, testimony, evidence. 
A. Yes. 
[Prosecutor]: All beyond a reasonable doubt. 
A. Yes. 
[Prosecutor]: Do you understand that? 
A. Yes. 







































A. I believe so. 
[Prosecutor]: If I don't do my job and put forth the evidence 
to convince you when it's time to go back into the jury room, can 
you vote not guilty? 
A. Yes. 
(Trial Tr., p. 117, L.22 - p.118, L.14.) Based on this exchange, the prosecutor 
objected to Jackson's motion to excuse Juror #34 for cause. (Trial Tr., p.119, 
Ls.15-16.) 
Upon further inquiry by defense counsel, Juror #34 reiterated the 
assurance, initially made to the prosecutor, that she believed she would require 
the state to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. (Trial Tr., p.126, L.20 -
p.128, L.15.) Defense counsel followed up on this response and the following 
exchange occurred: 
[Defense Counsel]: Okay. Well, let me ask one last 
question. If you were afraid [Jackson] did this but you don't think 
[the state] proved it, would you find [Jackson] guilty anyway? 
A. I guess I would have a hard time if I felt like the 
prosecution, you know, didn't. 
[Defense Counsel]: And then maybe your job would be to 
make up the difference. 
A. Put forth enough. 
[Defense Counsel]: So basically the answer would be yes. 
A. Yeah. 
[Defense Counsel]: If they gave you enough to hang your 
hat on, even if they didn't really prove beyond a reasonable doubt, 
just to make sure, just to make sure, that he doesn't get away with 
it. 
6 
A. Yeah. I - you know just because of the nature of this 
case. 
(Trial Tr., p.128, L.16- p.129, L.8.) 
Following the above exchange, the prosecutor reminded Juror #34 that 
she had "taken an oath already" and asked: "And if you were going to be one 
[of] the jurors who will take another oath, can you follow that oath?" (Trial Tr., 
p.129, L.22 - p.130, L.2.) Juror #34 responded: "I'd like to say that I could 
follow that oath but with what [defense counsel] was proposing, if that were to 
happen, I don't know if - if I would be able to just keep that beyond a reasonable 
doubt concrete mind set."1 (Trial Tr., p.130, Ls.10-14.) The prosecutor then 
discussed with Juror #34 the meaning of "beyond a reasonable doubt" (Trial Tr., 
p.130, L.15 - p.131, L.21), after which the discussion concluded as follows: 
[Prosecutor]: . . . But you do understand that I have the 
burden. I have to show that he's guilty. 
A. Right. 
[Prosecutor]: And if I don't do that, you have to vote not 
guilty. 
A. Right. 
[Prosecutor]: That's your duty. 
A. (JUROR NODS HEAD AFFIRMATIVELY.) 
[Prosecutor]: Right? 
1 In his Appellant's brief, Jackson repeatedly represents that Juror #34 
volunteered this statement, without being asked any particular question by the 
prosecutor or defense counsel. (Appellant's brief, pp.3, 12.) Even a cursory 
review of the transcript shows Jackson is incorrect. (See Trial Tr., p.129, L.22 -
p.130, L.14 (prosecutor asking question, court interjecting to ask prosecutor to 
move and prosecutor complying with request, Juror #34 responding specifically 








































[Prosecutor]: And you can do that. 
A. Yes. 
[Prosecutor]: Thank you. Do you feel like you could be 
fair and impartial in this case if it came down to a close 
question? 
A. Yes. 
(Trial Tr., p.131, L.18 - p.132, L.12 (emphasis added)). Following this exchange, 
defense counsel declined the court's invitation to conduct further inquiry. (Trial 
Tr., p.132, Ls.13-15.) The trial court then denied Jackson's motion to excuse 
Juror#34forcause. (Trial Tr., p.132, Ls.16-17.) 
Without so much as citing, much less quoting, the final exchange 
(emphasized above) between the prosecutor and Juror #34, Jackson argues on 
appeal that the district court abused its discretion by denying his request to 
excuse Juror #34 for cause because, he contends, the juror "had expressed her 
predisposition to believe the alleged victim's account over the defendant's 
account" (Appellant's brief, p.12), thus indicating an "unrefuted bias in favor of 
the alleged victim" (id., p.12, n.12).2 Jackson's argument is plainly belied by the 
2 Citing p.130, L.15 - p.132, L.8 of the trial transcript, Jackson does 
acknowledge in a footnote that the prosecutor "attempt[ed] to rehabilitate the 
juror in regard to the burden of proof," but, he contends, "no such rehabilitation 
was attempted in regard to her assertion that she would believe the alleged 
victim rather than Mr. Jackson." (Appellant's brief, p.12, n.12.) Notably, in 
making this argument, Jackson conspicuously fails to cite the lines of transcript 
that immediately follow, in which Juror #34 made the unequivocal assurance that 
she "could be fair and impartial in this case if it came down to a close question." 
(See Trial Tr., p.132, Ls.9-12.) 
8 
record. Although Juror #34 initially indicated she would have difficulty accepting 
Jackson's testimony over that of the victim, she ultimately and unequivocally 
assured the court and counsel that she would not only hold the state to its 
burden of proving the case beyond a reasonable doubt, but would also "be fair 
and impartial in this case if it came down to a close question." (Trial Tr., p.130, 
L.15 - p.132, L.12.) Because, in the end, Juror #34 indicated without 
qualification that she would be fair and impartial, the trial court was entitled to 
rely on that assurance and, in light of that assurance, did not abuse its discretion 
in denying Jackson's motion to excuse Juror #34 for cause. See Morris, 130 
Idaho at 141,937 P.2d at 1215 (trial court does not abuse discretion by declining 
to excuse for cause "jurors whose answers during voir dire initially give rise to 
challenges for cause but who latter assure the court that they will be able to 
remain fair and impartial"); Nightengale, 151 Idaho at 353, 256 P.3d at 761 (trial 
court did not abuse discretion in refusing to excuse for cause juror who initially 
indicated bias against plaintiffs but who later stated she could "set bias and 
anger aside and make an impartial decision"). 
2. Even If The Court Erred In Not Excusing Juror #34 For Cause, 
Jackson Has Failed To Show He Was Denied His Right To An 
Unbiased Jury 
Even assuming the trial court erred in denying Jackson's motion to excuse 
Juror #34 for cause, the error was harmless. Jackson used one of his 
peremptory challenges to excuse Juror #34, "thereby remov[ing] [Juror #34] from 
the jury as effectively as if the trial court had excused [her] for cause." Ross, 487 

































remove a juror it argues should have been removed for cause, the party must 
show on appeal that 'he was prejudiced by being required to use a peremptory 
challenge to remove the juror."' Nightengale, 151 Idaho at 354, 256 P.3d at 762 
(quoting State v. Ramos, 119 Idaho 568, 570, 808 P.2d 1313, 1315 (1991)) 
(brackets omitted). To demonstrate prejudice, Jackson must show that the 
denial of his motion to excuse Juror #34 for cause, and the subsequent need to 
use a peremptory challenge to excuse her, resulted in the seating on the jury of 
one or more other jurors who were biased. Nightengale, 151 Idaho at 354, 256 
P.3d at 762; Ramos, 119 Idaho at 569-70, 808 P.2d at 1314-15; State v. 
Wozniak, 94 Idaho 312,319,486 P.2d 1025, 1032 (1971), overruled on other 
grounds QY State v. Tucker, 97 Idaho 4, 539 P.2d 556 (1975); see also Ross, 
487 U.S. at 86 (where defendant uses a peremptory challenge to remove a juror 
who should have been excused for cause, "[a]ny claim that the jury was not 
impartial . . . must focus not on [the removed juror], but on the jurors who 
ultimately sat"). Jackson has failed to carry his burden. 
Jackson never moved to excuse for cause any of the jurors who were 
actually empanelled to decide his case, nor did he otherwise argue to the trial 
court that one or more of those jurors were biased. (Compare Trial Tr., p.14, 
L.19 - p.143, L.9 with Trial Tr., p.144, Ls.9-18.) Nevertheless, he argues on 
appeal that, after he exercised one of his peremptory challenges to excuse Juror 
#34, two jurors who were biased against him still remained on the panel, thus 
"depriv[ing] him of his constitutional rights to an impartial jury." (Appellant's brief, 
pp.12-13 (citations omitted).) Because Jackson did not raise this argument to 
10 
the district court, he must demonstrate on appeal that the seating of the two 
jurors he claims were biased constituted fundamental error. See State v. Perry, 
150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 961, 976 (2010) (unpreserved issue may only be 
considered on appeal if it constitutes fundamental error); State v. Adams, 147 
Idaho 857, 216 P.3d 146 (Ct. App. 2009) (defendant claiming for first time on 
appeal that trial court should have removed a juror for cause because she 
exhibited bias was required to demonstrate fundamental error). To demonstrate 
fundamental error, Jackson must show that (1) "one or more of [his] unwaived 
constitutional rights were violated;" (2) the constitutional error is "clear or 
obvious" on the record, "without the need for any additional information" including 
information "as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision;" and (3) 
"the error affected [Jackson's] substantial rights," generally by showing a 
reasonable probability that the error "affected the outcome of the trial 
proceedings." Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. Although Jackson 
argues otherwise, a review of the record and the applicable law shows that 
Jackson's unpreserved claim of juror bias fails on all three prongs of Perry. 
First, Jackson has failed to demonstrate that the seating of Juror #57 and 
Juror #54 - the jurors Jackson claims were biased against him - violated his 
"unwaived constitutional right[s]" to an impartial jury because a review of the 
record shows neither juror was actually biased. Outside the presence of the rest 
of the prospective jurors, Juror #57 advised the court and counsel that she 
believed she could be impartial but, based on a personal experience she had as 








































Tr., p.70, L.6-22.) In response to subsequent questioning by counsel, Juror #57 
indicated a belief that she would be able to "hold [her] emotions in check" (Trial 
Tr., p.71, Ls.1-22); that she would "[a]bsolutely" "listen to all the testimony, [and] 
see the evidence before [she] made any type of decision" (Trial Tr., p.71, L.23 -
p. 72, L.5); and that she would not be more likely to believe the child victim over 
anyone else who testified, ultimately explaining: "I've also had firsthand 
experience with a child who wasn't honest about something like that so I've 
experienced both sides of that so that is the reason why I believe I could be 
impartial because I'm open to listen to both sides of that" (Trial Tr., p.72, Ls.8-
16). In light of Juror #57's assurances that she believed she could remain 
impartial and would "absolutely" decide the case based on the evidence and 
testimony presented, Jackson cannot demonstrate that Juror #57 harbored any 
bias that would have been grounds to excuse her for cause had such motion 
been made. 
Jackson likewise cannot demonstrate that Juror #54 harbored any bias 
against him. During voir dire, the prosecutor indicated that he knew Juror #54 
"just a little bit," and he also knew Juror #54's husband and son. (Trial Tr., p.77, 
Ls.4-5.) When asked by the prosecutor whether those affiliations would "sway 
[her] in any sense," Juror #54 responded, "It might." (Trial Tr., p.77, Ls.5-8.) 
Ultimately, however, Juror #54 indicated she could be fair to both the prosecutor 
and Jackson. (Trial Tr., p.77, Ls.9-14.) Thus, notwithstanding Jackson's 
characterizations of Juror #54's responses to questioning as indicating a "pro-
prosecution bias" "that she might be able to keep under control" (Appellant's 
12 
brief, pp.5, 13-14), the record actually shows Juror #54 indicated a willingness 
I 
I 
and ability to be fair and impartial to both parties. Jackson has failed to I 
demonstrate from the record that either Juror #54 or Juror #57 were biased 
against him and, as such, has failed to establish that the seating of those jurors 
violated his constitutional right to an impartial jury. Jackson's claim fails on the 
first prong of Perry. 
Even if Jackson could satisfy the first prong of the Perry fundamental error 
analysis, his claim nevertheless fails on the second prong because the alleged 
error is not "clear or obvious" on the record, "without the need for any additional 
information" including information "as to whether the failure to object was a 
tactical decision." Perry, 250 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. Indeed, the Idaho 
Court of Appeals has specifically held that a decision whether to challenge a 
potential juror for cause falls within the category of "legitimate strategic or tactical 
choices by defense counsel, which generally cannot be discerned from the 
record on appeal." State v. Adams, 147 Idaho 857, 861, 216 P.3d 146, 150 (Ct. 
App. 2009) (emphasis added).3 The Court explained: 
In assessing whether to challenge a particular juror, attorneys must 
not only weigh the perceived negative features against the 
favorable features of that particular juror, they must also consider 
whether eliminating the juror could result in an even less 
3 Although Adams was decided before Perry, the Idaho Court of Appeals in 
Adams articulated as the basis for its holding the very rationale upon which the 
Perry fundamental error test is based - i.e., to encourage contemporaneous 
objecti0ns so that trial courts can prevent or cure the alleged error in a timely 
manner, and to prevent defendants "from 'sandbagging' by remaining silent 
about a recognized error and belatedly raising the error only if the case does not 
conclude in his favor." Adams, 14 7 Idaho at 861, 216 P. 3d at 150 ( citing Puckett 
v. United States, [556 U.S. 129, 134] (2009)); compare Perry, 150 Idaho at 224, 





























acceptable individual moving into that position on the jury panel. 
Here, the absence of a challenge to Juror 608 may have been a 
tactical decision by defense counsel, because although Juror 608 
gave some problematical answers in voir dire, other factors may 
have led defense counsel to believe that she was, on balance, a 
person that he wanted on the jury or that she was more acceptable 
than another who might be substituted for her. After the conviction, 
and in hindsight, Adams now contends that the trial court should 
have intervened sua sponte to exclude the juror for cause. We are 
of the view that trial courts should not be required or encouraged, 
in any but the most extreme circumstances to interfere with 
legitimate tactics of counsel by excusing for cause a juror who has 
not been challenged by either party. Therefore, we will not find 
fundamental error in such trial court inaction in the absence of a 
clear record that a potential juror would be so biased against a 
criminal defendant, or otherwise excludable for cause, that neither 
the trial court nor defense counsel could have reasonably allowed 
the juror to serve. 
Adams, 147 Idaho at 861-62, 216 P.3d at 150-51. As in Adams, "[s]uch a record 
does not exist here." !sL at 862, 216 P.3d at 151. 
Jackson did not object for cause to the seating of either Juror #57 or Juror 
#54, nor did he exercise any of his 11 peremptory challenges to remove them 
from the jury. Such is hardly surprising since, as explained above, neither juror 
expressed any clear bias against Jackson. In fact, Juror #57 indicated she "had 
firsthand experience with a child who wasn't honest about something like that 
[being the victim of sexual abuse]" and, as such, would not be more likely to 
believe the child victim. (Trial Tr., p.72, Ls.8-16.) Given this response, and 
given Juror #54's assurance that she could be fair to both parties (Trial Tr., p.77, 
Ls.4-14), defense counsel may very well have decided, as a tactical matter, that 
Juror #57 and Juror #54 were, "on balance, [individuals] that he wanted on the 
jury" or, at the very least, that they were "more acceptable than [other potential 
jurors] who might be substituted for [them]." Adams, 147 Idaho at 861, 216 P.3d 
14 
at 150. Because it is impossible to discern from this record whether trial 
counsel's decision not to challenge the seating of Juror #57 and Juror #54 was 
anything other than tactical, Jackson has failed to carry his burden under prong 
two of Perry of showing clear error. 
Finally, Jackson has failed to show prejudice. The only prejudice Jackson 
identifies is the "fact that two biased jurors sat as members of the jury." 
(Appellant's brief, p.16.) Because, as set forth above, neither Juror #57 nor 
Juror #54 harbored any clear bias against him, Jackson's claim of prejudice and, 
ultimately, his claim of fundamental error under Perry, necessarily fail. 
Jackson has failed to demonstrate from the record any violation of his 
right to an impartial jury. The juror Jackson moved to excuse for cause did not 
actually sit on the jury, nor has Jackson shown from the record that Juror #57 
and Juror #54, whom Jackson never challenged for cause, were clearly biased 
against him. Having failed to establish the denial of his motion to excuse Juror 
#34 for cause resulted in the seating on the jury of other biased jurors, Jackson 
has failed to show any basis for reversal of his conviction. 
II. 
Jackson Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Denying His Motion For 
Appointment Of Counsel To Pursue His Rule 35 Motion 
A. Introduction 
Following sentencing, Jackson's privately retained trial counsel filed on 
Jackson's behalf a notice of appeal, a motion for the waiver of fees on appeal 
and a motion for the appointment of appellate counsel at public expense. (R., 






































incarcerated, unemployed, and had "no assets, bank accounts, stocks, [or] 
bonds," and that "any other item of value in his name [was] estimated at a total of 
$4000." (R., pp.168, 170) The district court, finding good cause to do so, 
granted the motions and ordered Jackson to be "appointed counsel for his 
appeal at no cost." (R., pp.182, 185.) 
Approximately two months later, Jackson filed a Motion and [unnotarized] 
Affidavit In Support for Appointment of Counsel and a handwritten letter 
requesting the appointment of counsel to assist him in the filing of a Rule 35 
motion. (R., pp.190-92; Letter from Defendant to Alexandria Lewis filed 
December 7, 2011 (Exhibit).) The district court denied the motion for 
appointment of counsel to pursue a Rule 35 motion, reasoning: 
[T]he Affidavit in Support for Appointment of Counsel, which Mr. 
Jackson filed, is not notarized. Further, Mr. Jackson did not file a 
Financial Affidavit with the Court. Therefore, the Court is unable to 
determine whether Mr. Jackson is indigent for the purposes of this 
motion. The Court considers Mr. Jackson indigent for the purposes 
of an appeal where the legal fees would be thousands of dollars 
and Mr. Jackson has no income. For a Rule 35 motion, however, 
Mr. Jackson may have sufficient resources to pay for private 
counsel. 
(R., p.193.) 
On or about the same day the court entered its order denying Jackson's 
motion for the appointment of counsel, Jackson filed a pro se Rule 35 motion, 
and a handwritten letter in support thereof, seeking leniency because, he 
contended, his trial counsel was ineffective, the evidence against him was 
insufficient to support his convictions and he did not receive a fair trial. (R., 
pp.195-98; Letter from Defendant to Janet Meserve filed December 12, 2011 
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(Exhibit).) Concluding Jackson failed to provide any new information to 
demonstrate his sentence was excessive, the district court denied the motion 
without a hearing. (R., pp.201-04.) 
Jackson argues on appeal that, having already found him indigent for 
purposes of appeal, "the district court's decision to deny Mr. Jackson the 
assistance of counsel in pursuit of his motion for Rule 35 relief," based on what 
Jackson characterizes as a mere failure to properly fill out his paperwork, 
"violated Mr. Jackson's constitutional and statutory rights to an attorney." 
(Appellant's brief, pp.17-22.) Jackson's argument fails for two alternative 
reasons. First, Jackson failed to carry his burden under I.C. § 19-854 of 
demonstrating he was a "needy person" with respect to his Rule 35 motion and, 
as such, the district court properly determined he was not entitled to appointed 
counsel. Second, even assuming Jackson was a "needy person" for purposes of 
his Rule 35 motion, the denial of Jackson's motion for appointed counsel should 
be affirmed on the alternative basis that the Rule 35 motion Jackson ultimately 
filed was frivolous and not one that a "reasonable person with adequate means 
would be willing to bring at his own expense." I.C. § 19-852(b)(3). 
B. Standards Of Review 
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which the 
appellate court exercises free review. State v. Lee, 153 Idaho 559, 561, 286 
P.3d 537, 539 (2012). 
Denial of court appointed counsel under I.C. § 19-852(b)(3) is "within the 









































presented are frivolous." Swisher v. State, 129 Idaho 467, 468-69, 926 P.2d 
1314, 1315-16 (Ct. App. 1996) (addressing a post-conviction proceeding and not 
a Rule 35 motion). But see State v. Wade, 125 Idaho 522, 873 P.2d 167 (Ct. 
App. 1994) (applying free review to whether the district court erred by denying 
Rule 35 motion prior to ruling on motion for court appointed counsel). 
C. The District Court Properly Denied Jackson's Motion For Appointed 
Counsel To Pursue His Rule 35 Motion Because Jackson Failed To Carry 
His Threshold Burden Under I.C. § 19-854 Of Demonstrating He Was A 
"Needy Person" With Respect To That Motion 
A criminal defendant has the right to counsel at all critical stages of the 
criminal process, including the pursuit of a Rule 35 motion. I.C. § 19-852(b)(3); 
Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 923 n.3, 828 P.2d 1323, 1328 n.3 (Ct. App. 
1992); see also U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV. The right to court appointed 
counsel is not automatic, however. Rather, to be entitled to the appointment of 
counsel at public expense, a criminal defendant must demonstrate as a 
threshold matter that he or she is a "needy person" with respect to the 
proceeding for which the appointment of counsel is sought. I.C. § 19-854(a), (b); 
Quinlivan v. State, 94 Idaho 334, 335, 487 P.2d 928, 929 (1971). Specifically, 
I.C. § 19-854 provides in relevant part: 
(a) The determination of whether a person covered by 
section 19-852, Idaho Code, is a needy person shall be deferred 
until his first appearance in court or in a suit for payment or 
reimbursement under section 19-858, Idaho Code, whichever 
occurs earlier. Thereafter, the court concerned shall determine, 
with respect to each proceeding, whether he is a needy 
person. 
(b) In determining whether a person is a needy person and 
in determining the extent of his inability to pay, the court concerned 
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may consider such factors as income, property owned, outstanding 
obligations, and the number and ages of his dependents. Release 
on bail does not necessarily prevent him from being a needy 
person. In each case, the person shall, subject to the penalties 
for perjury, certify in writing or by other record such material 
factors relating to his ability to pay as the court prescribes. 
I.C. § 19-854(a), (b) (emphases added). 
"Judicial interpretation of a statute begins with an examination of the 
statute's literal words. If the statute is not ambiguous, [the appellate court] does 
not construe it, but simply follows the law as written." State v. Lee, 153 Idaho 
559, 561, 286 P.3d 537, 539 (2012) (internal citations omitted). The language of 
I.C. § 19-854(a) and (b) could not be more clear. Under the statute, a court 
considering a motion for the appointment of counsel must determine, "with 
respect to each proceeding," whether the individual seeking counsel is a "needy 
person," and the burden of establishing such need rests with the applicant, who 
must certify under penalty of perjury that he or she is unable to pay for the cost 
of representation. I.C. § 19-854(a), (b). Indeed, the Idaho Supreme Court has 
already interpreted the provisions of I.C. § 19-854 as requiring persons 
"requesting the aid of court appointed counsel [to] cooperate and furnish the 
court with all the information it requires to intelligently determine the extent of the 
individual's need." Quinlivan, 94 Idaho at 335, 487 P.2d at 928. 
In Quinlivan, the Idaho Supreme Court considered whether the district 
court properly denied Quinlivan's request for the appointment of counsel to 
represent him in a post-conviction proceeding. lg_,. At a hearing to determine his 
financial status, Quinlivan testified under oath that he received a $200 per month 








































requested the aid of counsel. kl After a continued hearing at which Quinlivan 
again refused to provide further testimony about his financial condition, the 
district court concluded Quinlivan was not indigent and denied his request for 
appointed counsel. kl 
Citing I.C. § 19-854(b) and noting that Quinlivan "did not furnish 
information pertaining to 'such material factors relating to his ability to pay as the 
court prescrib(ed),"' the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Quinlivan's 
motion for appointed counsel. Quinlivan, 94 Idaho at 335, 487 P.2d at 929 
(asterisks omitted, parentheses original). In so doing, the Court explained: 
The requirement [of I.C. § 19-854(b)] that a person seeking 
appointed counsel provide the district court with evidence of his 
financial status is not unreasonable and does not derogate from 
the right of indigents under the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. Other courts have held that the burden of 
making an initial showing of need is on the person claiming 
indigency. 
kl (citations omitted). Ultimately, the Court held: "[A] person cannot logically 
claim constitutional rights afforded to indigents and at the same time refuse to 
sup[p]ly information necessary to establish his status as an indigent." kl 
Just as I.C. § 19-854 imposed upon Quinlivan the burden of making an 
initial showing of need to support his request for the appointment of post-
conviction counsel, it likewise placed on Jackson the burden of demonstrating, 
as a threshold matter, an inability to pay for the cost of representation to pursue 
his Rule 35 motion. Although Jackson filed a form motion and affidavit asserting 
he was indigent, the affidavit was not notarized and, thus, did not meet the 
certification "subject to the penalties for perjury" requirement of I.C. § 19-854(b). 
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More importantly, and as noted by the district court in its order denying Jackson's 
motion for the appointment of counsel (R., p.193), the motion was not 
accompanied by any affidavit specifically detailing Jackson's financial status, 
thereby preventing the court from making an informed decision whether Jackson 
could afford counsel for the limited purpose of pursuing a Rule 35 motion or was 
instead indigent and unable to pay for the cost of representation in pursuit of his 
motion for leniency. Because Jackson did not supply the court with the 
information "necessary to establish his status as an indigent" with respect to his 
Rule 35 motion, Jackson failed to carry his burden under I.C. § 19-854 of 
demonstrating any entitlement to the appointment of counsel to pursue that 
motion. Quinlivan, 94 Idaho at 335, 487 P.2d at 929. 
Jackson challenges the denial of his motion for the appointment of 
counsel on several bases, none of which have merit. First, he cites I.C. § 19-
852(a) for the proposition that he "qualified as a 'needy person' since he was 
being detained after a conviction for a serious crime." (Appellant's brief, p.20.) 
Jackson's reliance on I.C. § 19-852(a) is misplaced because that statute merely 
identifies the circumstances under which a "needy person" is entitled to court 
appointed counsel; it does not define what a "needy person" is. Rather, it is I.C. 
§ 19-854, the provisions of which go completely uncited by Jackson in his 
Appellant's brief, that govern whether a person is needy such that he or she is 
entitled to court appointed counsel pursuant to I.C. § 19-852. Because, as set 








































was a needy person with respect to his Rule 35 motion, the district court properly 
denied his request for court appointed counsel to pursue that motion. 
Next, Jackson argues "he was entitled to an attorney at public expense [to 
pursue his Rule 35 motion] because the information in the record revealed that 
he had no resources upon which he could draw to hire counsel." (Appellant's 
brief, p.20 (citing R., p.168).) To support this assertion, Jackson relies on the 
representation made by his trial counsel in support of his Motion To Appoint 
Appellate Counsel that Jackson had "exhausted all resources available in 
securing trial counsel and is unable to secure counsel to prosecute this appeal." 
(R., p.168.) Jackson's reliance on this representation as a basis for entitlement 
to counsel with respect to his Rule 35 motion is misguided for at least two 
reasons. 
First, the representation was unsworn and made by trial counsel on 
Jackson's behalf and, as such, did not meet the requirements of I.C. §19-854(b) 
that Jackson himself "certify in writing," "subject to the penalties for perjury," the 
"material factors relating to his ability to pay." 
Second, the fact that the court granted Jackson's request for appellate 
counsel at public expense did not mean that Jackson was indigent for all 
purposes. Idaho Code § 19-854(a) specifically states that, after the defendant's 
initial appearance, the determination of whether the defendant is needy must be 
made by the court "with respect to each proceeding." Moreover, the burden of 
demonstrating such need lies with the individual requesting the appointment of 
counsel. I.C. § 19-854(b); Quinlivan, 94 Idaho at 335, 487 P.2d at 929. Here, 
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even accepting trial counsel's representations about Jackson's financial status, 
such representations only pertained to Jackson's ability to pay for the cost of 
representation on appeal. (See R., p.168 (representing Jackson "unable to 
secure counsel to prosecute this appeal").) In fact, according to trial counsel, 
while Jackson was unemployed, incarcerated, and had "no assets, bank 
accounts, stocks, [or] bonds," other "item[s] of value in his name [were] 
estimated at a total of $4000." (R., p.168.) From this information, the court 
reasonably determined that while Jackson was "indigent for the purposes of an 
appeal where the legal fees would be thousands of dollars and Mr. Jackson has 
no income," "[f]or a Rule 35 motion, ... Jackson may have sufficient resources to 
pay for private counsel." Because Jackson himself did not provide the court with 
any information upon which to base a reasoned determination that Jackson was 
a "needy person" with respect to a Rule 35 proceeding, as opposed to the 
appellate proceedings for which he had already been provided counsel, the 
district court properly exercised its authority under I.C. §§ 19-852 and 19-854 in 
denying Jackson's motion for the appointment of Rule 35 counsel. 
In a final argument, Jackson contends the district court exalted form over 
substance when it denied his motion for the appointment of Rule 35 counsel 
based on what Jackson characterizes as a mere failure to have his paperwork 
notarized. (Appellant's brief, p.21.) Citing the letter he filed contemporaneously 
with his motion for the appointment of counsel, Jackson notes he "explain[ed] the 
reason for not having the affidavit notarized: he believed that, due to factors 







































meeting with the notary public or the paralegal before the filing period for his 
Rule 35 motion expired." (Appellant's brief, p.21 (citing Letter from Defendant to 
Alexandria Lewis filed December 7, 2011).) The state notes that, at the time 
Jackson filed his motion for appointment of counsel and the accompanying letter, 
he still had nearly 40 days in which to timely file a Rule 35 motion. (Compare, 
R., p.177 (Judgment entered September 16, 2011) with p.190 (motion for 
appointment of Rule 35 counsel filed December 7, 2011).) Nevertheless, even 
assuming Jackson was unable to secure the services of a notary before the filing 
period for his Rule 35 motion expired, such does not excuse Jackson's utter 
failure to supply the court with specific information regarding his ability to pay for 
the costs of representation in a Rule 35 proceeding. The district court did not, as 
Jackson suggests, deny his request for counsel solely because the affidavit was 
not notarized; it denied his request because it was unable to determine from the 
information provided whether Jackson was "indigent for the purposes of [a Rule 
35] motion." (R., p.193.) Having failed to supply the court with even this most 
basic information regarding his financial status, Jackson failed to establish he 
was a "needy person" with respect to the Rule 35 proceeding and has, thus, 
failed on appeal to establish any error in the denial of his motion. I.C. § 19-854; 
Quinlivan, 94 Idaho at 335, 487 P.2d at 928. 
D. Alternatively, The Denial Of Jackson's Motion For Court Appointed 
Counsel To Pursue His Rule 35 Motion Should Be Affirmed Because His 
Rule 35 Motion Was Frivolous 
Even assuming Jackson was a "needy person" for purposes of his Rule 
35 motion, this Court should nevertheless affirm the denial of Jackson's motion 
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for appointed counsel on the alternative basis that the Rule 35 motion Jackson 
ultimately filed was frivolous. See, ~. State v. Stewart, 149 Idaho 383, 234 
P.3d 707, 712 (2010) (affirming denial of motion on correct theory, one not 
reached by trial court); McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 700, 992 P.2d 144, 
149 (1999) (if trial court reaches the correct result by erroneous theory, appellate 
court will affirm upon the correct theory). When a needy person seeks the 
appointment of counsel to pursue a Rule 35 motion, the trial may deny the 
appointment of counsel if the Rule 35 motion is frivolous or one that a 
reasonable person with adequate means would not be willing to bring at his or 
her own expense. I.C. § 19-852(b)(3). A determination of whether a motion for 
reduction of sentence is frivolous for purposes of applying I.C. § 19-852(b )(3) is 
based on the contents of the motion itself and any accompanying documentation 
that may support the motion. State v. Wade, 125 Idaho 522, 525, 873 P.2d 167, 
170 (Ct. App. 1994). Any colorable merit to a Rule 35 motion must arise from 
new or additional information that would create a basis for reduction of the 
sentence. .!.9..c; see also State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 202, 159 P.3d 838, 
839 (2007) (to prevail on Rule 35 motion, defendant has burden of "show[ing] 
that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information 
subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion"). A 
review of Jackson's Rule 35 motion and accompanying documentation shows 
the motion had no chance of success on the merits. 
Jackson did not support his Rule 35 motion with any new or additional 








































counsel was ineffective, the evidence against him was insufficient, and the 
proceedings against him were generally unfair. (R., pp.195-98; Letter from 
Defendant to Janet Meserve filed December 12, 2011 (Exhibit).) None of 
Jackson's claims constituted a legally cognizable basis for relief under Rule 35. 
See, ~. State v. Warren, 135 Idaho 836, 841-42, 25 P.3d 859, 864-65 (Ct. 
App. 2001) (Rule 35 subjects only the sentence to reexamination; it cannot be 
used as the procedural mechanism to attack the validity of the underlying 
conviction); State v. McDonald, 130 Idaho 963, 965, 950 P.2d 1302, 1304 (Ct. 
App. 1997) (same); Housley v. State, 119 Idaho 885, 889, 811 P.2d 495, 499 
(Ct. App. 1991) (same). As such, the Rule 35 motion was frivolous, and the 
district court's order denying Jackson's request for the appointment of counsel to 
pursue it should be affirmed on this alternative basis. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment and the 
denial of Jackson's motion for appointment of counsel to pursue his Rule 35 
motion. 
DATED this 11 th day of June 2013. 
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